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A  N O R M A T IV E  A N D  E M P I R I C A L  A P P R O A C H  TO  
P e t t y  a n d  C a c i o p p o ’s  ‘s t r o n g ’ a n d  ‘w e a k ’ 
A R G U M E N T S
What m akes a persuasive m essage persuasive? According to the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty &  Cacioppo 1986), argum ent 
quality plays an important role in the answer to this question. The 
present study takes a close look at this factor. First, background 
information will be given about the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM). Subsequently, the role o f argum ent quality in the ELM will 
be discussed. After that, the results will be presented o f a norm a­
tive and empirical study o f  Petty and Cacioppo’s research m aterial 
containing strong and weak arguments. These results will provide 
insight into the role o f argument quality in the persuasion process.
1 P e t t y  & C a c i o p p o ’ s  E l a b o r a t i o n  L i k e l i h o o d  M o d e l
According to the Elaboration Likelihood M odel, people can be 
persuaded into adopting a claim  by walking two different routes. 
The first route is called the central route. At this route, people sys­
tem atically exam ine the quality o f the given argum ents. I f  they 
agree with these arguments, they adopt the claim. I f  they disagree 
with the argum ents, they reject the claim . The second route is 
called the peripheral route. At this route, people are persuaded by 
peripheral cues. Peripheral cues are all non-argum entative fea­
tures o f a m essage that are capable o f  influencing the form ation 
or change o f  the receiver’s attitude. C om m only used peripheral 
cues are rules o f  thum b, such as ‘I f  this authority says so, it m ust 
be true’ or ‘ I f  hundreds o f  people used  this product before m e, 
it m ust be a good product.’
W hich route is being taken is determ ined by two factors: m oti­
vation and ability. Motivation is about wanting to process the per­
suasive m essage. I f  people want to be very sure o f the correctness 
o f their attitude, they will be very motivated to exam ine the given 
argum ents carefully. So, for example, m otivation is higher w hen 
a house is to be bought than a detergent. The second factor is 
about being able to process the m essage. The easier it is for peo­
ple to exam ine the given argum ents, the quicker they w ill p er­
form this task. Motivation as well as ability is required in order to 
follow the central route. I f  these conditions are not m et, the 
peripheral route will be taken.
2 A r g u m e n t  q u a l i t y
Petty and Cacioppo claim  that h igh ly involved people are m ore 
persuaded by strong than by weak argum ents. Many studies have 
used Petty and Cacioppo’s research material to - successfully - test 
this claim  (e.g., Burnkrant &  H ow ard 19 8 4 ; Heesacker, Petty &  
Cacioppo 19 8 3 ; Petty &  Cacioppo 19 7 9 , 19 8 4 ). However, Petty 
and Cacioppo m anipulated argum ent quality in their research 
m aterial by m eans o f  an empirical defin ition. They define ‘a 
“strong m essage” as one containing argum ents such that when 
subjects are instructed to think about the m essage, the thoughts 
that they generate are predom inantly favorable. [...] the argu ­
m ents in a w eak m essage are such that when subjects are 
instructed to th ink about them , the thoughts that they generate 
are predom inantly unfavorable’ (Petty &  Cacioppo 19 8 6 : 32).
O’ Keefe (19 9 0 : n o )  aptly notes on this subject that if, ‘in  a 
given investigation, an argum ent-strength m anipulation did not
influence persuasive effects under conditions o f high elaboration 
[...], the conclusion would not be “This result d isconfirm s the 
ELM ’s prediction,” but instead “The m anipulations w ere som e­
how defective; either the study didn’t effectively m anipulate argu­
m ent strength, or it didn’t effectively manipulate elaboration like­
lihood conditions, because by definition stronger argum ents lead 
to greater persuasion under conditions o f  higher elaboration.” To 
say that under conditions o f  high elaboration, strong argum ents 
have been found to be m ore effective than weak argum ents” is 
rather like saying “Bachelors have been found to be unm arried.” 
We didn’t need em pirical research to find these things out’ .
Furtherm ore, Petty and Cacioppo have left aside the specific 
cause o f  the difference betw een their strong and w eak argu­
m ents. O’ Keefe ( 19 9 0 ,19 9 5 )  therefore proposes to further con­
ceptualise and concretise the concept o f  argum ent quality. He 
suggests the u se  o f ‘som e independently-m otivated account o f 
argum ent quality’ (1995: 14) by m eans o f  which Petty and 
Cacioppo’s research m aterial can be analysed. This ‘normatively- 
guided analysis o f  these m essages m ay offer som e insights into 
just what aspects o f  the m essages m ay be contributing to the 
observed effects.’ (O’Keefe 19 9 5 : 14). For example, it m ay be the 
case that it is the argum ent not linking up with the given claim  
that causes the weakness o f  the argument.
The analysis and evaluation m ethod o f  Schellens and Verho­
even (1994) is an exam ple o f such an independently-m otivated 
account o f  argum ent quality. Schellens and Verhoeven have 
developed several argum ent types, o f which ‘Explanation’ is an 
example:
B is (in general) explained by A.
B is the case.
Hence: (probably) A.
Each argum ent type is accom panied by a set o f  evaluation ques­
tions. Exam ples o f evaluation questions belonging to the argu­
m ent type ‘Explanation’ are:
Are there reasons to doubt B?
Is A  a necessary condition for B?
Are there other possible explanations for B im aginable and 
plausible?
Evaluation questions address for exam ple the correctness o f the 
relationship between a claim  and its argum ent or the desirability 
o f  an argum ent. A  positive answ er to an evaluation question 
m eans that the argum entation is strong on this part. A  negative 
answer m eans that the argum entation is weak on this part.
Areni and Lutz (1988) also address Petty and Cacioppo’s argu­
ment quality. They divide argum ent quality into two components: 
argum ent strength and argum ent valence. Argument strength is 
defined as the ‘subjective probability that the attitude object is 
associated with some outcome or consequence’ . Argument valence 
is the ‘audience’s evaluation o f that consequence’ (1988: 198) or, 
in other words, the desirability o f  this outcome or consequence. 
For example, in  the argum entation ‘Studying harder leads to an
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increase o f the grade point average’, argum ent strength addresses 
the probability that studying harder (the attitude object) is asso­
ciated with the increase o f the grade point average (the outcome 
or consequence). A rgum ent valence deals with the desirability o f 
this increase.
Areni and Lutz carried out an experim ent in which participants 
had to determ ine the argum ent strength and valence in Petty and 
Cacioppo’s research m aterial. The results only showed a d iffer­
ence betw een the strong and w eak argum ents in argum ent 
valence, but not in argum ent strength. These results led to their 
conclusion that Petty and Cacioppo only m anipulated argum ent 
valence instead o f  the broader argum ent quality.
Areni and Lutz suggest research in which argum ent strength is 
also manipulated. They suggest that people have to be m ore m oti­
vated and able to find weaknesses in argum ent strength than in 
argum ent valence. This is because judging the argum ent strength 
m eans ju dging  probability and logical coherence. T his task is 
m ore dem anding than judging the argum ent valence, the desir­
ability o f  an attribute.
T he present study consists o f  two parts: an analytical and an 
experim ental part, inspired by O ’Keefe (19 9 0 , 1995) and Areni 
and Lutz (1988). The purpose o f the analytical part was to exam ­
ine whether Petty and Cacioppo’s strong and weak arguments dif­
fer from  each other norm atively. To accom plish this, the argu­
m ents in their research m aterial were analysed by m eans o f 
Schellens and Verhoeven's m ethod, which can be used  norm a­
tively. Furtherm ore, this analytical part concentrates on the spe­
cific characteristics in which the strong arguments differ from  the 
weak argum ents.
The aim  o f the experim ental part was to observe whether there 
is an effect o f argum ent strength on the persuasiveness o f a m es­
sage, as suggested by Areni and Lutz. Are highly involved people 
m ore persuaded by strong than by weak argum ents w hen argu­
m ent strength is m anipulated, while argum ent valence is kept 
constant?
3 P e t t y  a n d  C a c i o p p o ’ s  R e s e a r c h  M a t e r i a l : A n a l y s i s  
a n d  Ev a l u a t i o n
Petty and Cacioppo’s research m aterial consists o f  eighteen short 
argum ents, all in  favour o f im plem enting the so-called ‘Senior 
Com prehensive Exam’ (SCE) at universities in the United States. 
The Senior C om prehensive Exam  is ‘a requirem ent for gradua­
tion; the exam  w ould be a test o f  what the student had learned 
after com pleting the major, and a certain score would be required 
i f  the student was to graduate’ (Petty, H arkins &  W illiam s 19 80 : 
87).Nine o f the argum ents are strong; the other nine are weak or 
very weak. A s m entioned, the division into strong and weak is 
based on Petty and Cacioppo’s em pirical definition.
Hypothesis. It was hypothesized that Petty and Cacioppo’s strong 
argum ents are stronger than their weak argum ents not only 
empirically, but also normatively. Support for this hypothesis 
is given by O ’Keefe, am ong others: ‘i f  one exam ines the 
“ strong-argum ent” and “weak-argum ent” m essages, it’s 
apparent that these do differ in norm ative quality -  the 
“strong-argument” m essages in fact do make normatively bet­
ter argum ents than do the “w eak-argum ent” m essages’ 
(O’ Keefe 19 9 5 : 13). Schellens and Verhoeven’s m ethod was 
used to test the hypothesis.
Question. A  question was asked about the possible cause o f the dif­
ference between Petty and Cacioppo’s strong and weak argu­
m ents. Petty and Cacioppo barely touched upon this issue 
themselves. They only mentioned (Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman 
19 8 1: 850) that their strong argum ents contain persuasive evi­
dence in the form  o f statistics and data and that their weak 
argum ents contain quotations, personal opinions and exam ­
ples. Furtherm ore, O’Keefe found a difference between the 
strong and weak argum ents in ‘ (for example) the relevance o f
the evidence to the conclusions drawn, in the apparent self- 
interest o f  cited evidence sources, in the desirability o f the ben­
efits claim ed to attach to the advocated position, and so on’ 
(O’Keefe 19 9 5: 13-14)· And we already know  that A reni and 
Lutz found a difference in desirability (i.e. argum ent valence) 
between the strong and weak argum ents. This latter finding 
was the reason for the present study to answer the question by 
looking in the research m aterial at argum ent strength and 
argum ent valence specifically.
Procedure. Two judges perform ed the analysis and evaluation, one 
o f them  being a lecturer in argum entation. M r Verhoeven 
advised them  on som e global problem s. Each argum ent was 
analysed by charting the argum ent types used .2 
Analysis. Each o f the 18 argum ents contains a claim  plus several 
argum entations. Each claim  consists o f  the attitude object 
(i.e., the introduction o f the SCE) and an attribute varying per 
argument. Exam ples o f  these attributes are:
A  sharper increase o f  the grade point average (strong argu­
m ent 1)
H igher starting salaries (strong argum ent 8)
A n increase o f students’ anxiety (weak argum ent 1)
More parental support (weak argum ent 3)
Et cetera
The object and attribute are linked by a cause-effect relationship: 
the introduction o f  the Senior Com prehensive Exam  is the cause 
o f the attribute. Hence, the claims are form ulated as follows: 'The 
introduction o f  the SC E leads to (for example) h igher starting 
salaries.’
On a global level o f analysis, all claim s can be seen as argu­
ments. The argum ent type ‘Advantage’ links these argum ents to 
the general overlapping claim  ‘T he introduction o f  the SC E is 
desirable’:
A  leads to B: The introduction o f  the SC E leads to the attrib­
ute.
B is desirable: The attribute is desirable.
Thus, A  is desirable: The introduction o f the SC E is desirable.
It is ‘Advantage’ that is used here, because this argum ent type 
points to the positive or negative effects o f  a possible action or 
measure, which is the case here. The attribute o f  the first strong 
argum ent ‘A n  increase o f  the grade point average’ can for exam ­
ple be seen as a positive effect o f the introduction o f  the Senior 
Com prehensive Exam.
This ‘Advantage’ interpretation is supported in the literature. 
O’Keefe (1995:13-14) and Areni and Lutz (19 8 8 :19 8 ) m ention for 
example that the introduction o f the SCE is accom panied by very 
positive attributes (‘h igher starting salaries’) in the case o f  the 
strong argum ents and by less positive (‘m ore parental support’) 
or even negative (‘an increase o f  the students’ anxiety’) attributes 
in the case o f the weak argum ents.
The analysis per argum ent -  on a lower level - is illustrated by 
the first strong argum ent:
The National Scholarship Achievem ent Board recently revealed 
the results o f a five-year study conducted on the effectiveness o f 
com prehensive exam s at D uke University. The results o f  the 
study showed that since the com prehensive exam has been intro­
duces at Duke, the grade point average o f  undergraduates has 
increased by 31% . At com parable schools w ithout the exam s, 
grades increased by only 8%  over the sam e period. The prospect 
o f  a com prehensive exam  clearly seem s to be effective in  chal­
lenging students to work harder and faculty to teach m ore effec­
tively. It is likely that the benefits observed at D uke U niversity 
could also be observed at other universities that adopt the exam  
policy. (Petty &  Cacioppo 19 8 6 : 54-55)
‘Explanation’ is one o f  the argum ent types that supports the 
claim 'The introduction o f the Senior Com prehensive Exam leads
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to a sharper increase o f  the grade point average o f undergradu­
ates’ . This argum ent type explains the sharper increase o f  the 
grade point average: students are working harder and faculty is 
teaching more effectively. The schem e looks as follows:
B is (in general) caused by A: A  sharper increase o f  the grade 
point average is caused by students w orking harder and fac­
ulty teaching m ore effectively.
B is the case: The grade point average has increased m ore 
sharply.
Thus, (probably) A: The students worked harder and faculty 
taught m ore effectively.
Evaluation. After the 18 argum ents were analysed, the evaluation 
questions belonging to the argum ent types found were 
answered. To illustrate, three ‘Explanation’ questions and their 
answers are given:
A re there reasons to doubt the increase o f  the grade point 
average? No
Are the students’ hard work and faculty teaching m ore effec­
tively necessary conditions for the increase o f the grade point 
average? No
Are there other possible explanations for the increase im agi­
nable and plausible? Yes, fo r  example, the students do not waste 
time studying irrelevant subjects anymore.
Subsequently, the answers were evaluated as positive, negative or 
neutral. As said before, ‘positive’ m eans that the argum entation 
is strong on this part; ‘negative’ m eans that the argum entation is 
weak on this part. The neutral answers were not relevant for test­
ing the hypothesis and were therefore left aside.
To answer the question about the cause o f the possible d iffer­
ence between the strong and w eak argum ents, the evaluation 
questions were divided into argum ent strength and argum ent 
valence. I f  an evaluation question addressed the probability o f the 
link between the attitude object (i.e., the SCE) and the attribute 
(e.g., higher starting salaries), it was classified  as an argum ent 
strength question. For example: ‘Is the occurrence o f A  in general 
a necessary condition for B ?’ I f  a question addressed the desir­
ability o f  the attribute, it was classified  as an argum ent valence 
question. For example: ‘Is B really desired?’
Table 1 Average percentages of positive and negative answers, in total and 
subdivided into 'argument strength’ and ‘argument valence’ .
Total Argument Strength Argument Valence
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Strong 89,66 3,10 54,83 2,99 34,84 0,00
Weak 71,41 25,30 35,31 14,58 36,10 10,73
Results. The answ ers were analysed by m eans o f a m ultivariate 
one-way analysis o f variance. The data in Table 1 show that the 
hypothesis is confirm ed: Petty and Cacioppo' s strong argu­
m ents are in fact norm atively stronger than their weak argu­
m ents. The percentage o f  positive answ ers is higher for the 
strong argum ents than for the weak argum ents (89 .6 6  > 
7 1.4 1; F  ( 1,16 )  = 27.42, p < .01). Hence, the strong argum ents 
yielded more positive answers than the weak argum ents. Fur­
thermore, the percentage o f  negative answers is higher for the 
weak arguments than for the strong argum ents (25.30 > 3 .10 ; 
F  ( 1,16 )  = 8 0 .14 , P < -0 1)· The weak argum ents yielded m ore 
negative answers than the strong argum ents.
Table 1 also reveals the answer to the question about the possible 
cause o f the d ifference between the strong and weak argu ­
m ents: they differ from  each other in argum ent strength as 
well as in argum ent valence. For argum ent strength, the per­
centage o f positive answers is higher for the strong arguments
than for the weak argum ents (54,83 > 35,31; F  ( 1,16 )  =  9.62, p
< .0 1). W ith regard to argum ent strength, the strong argu­
m ents thus yielded m ore positive answ ers than the weak 
argum ents and are therefore stronger than the weak argu­
ments. Also, the percentage o f  negative answers is higher for 
the weak argum ents than for the strong argum ents (14.58 > 
2 .9 9 ; F  (1, 16) =  12.35, P <  -OI)· Hence, the weak argum ents 
yielded m ore negative answ ers than the strong argum ents 
and are therefore weaker than the strong argum ents.
For argum ent valence, the analysis led to the following pic­
ture: the percentage o f  positive answ ers for the strong argu­
m ents equals the percentage for the weak argum ents (34.84 
= 36 .10 ; F  (1, 16) < 1). Hence, there is no difference between 
the strong and w eak argum ents in the am ount o f  positive 
answ ers; the strong and w eak argum ents are equally strong 
as far as the am ount o f  positive answers is concerned. But the 
w eak argum ents do get m ore negative answ ers than the 
strong argum ents (10.73 > 0 -0 ° ;  F  ( 1,16 )  = 9.08, p  < .ox). The 
weak argum ents thus yielded m ore negative answers than the 
strong argum ents and are therefore weaker than the strong 
argum ents.
Conclusions. W hen u sing an independently-motivated account o f 
argum ent quality, there turns out to be an overall difference 
between Petty and Cacioppo’s strong and weak argum ents: 
their strong argum ents are in fact stronger than their weak 
argum ents, not only em pirically but also norm atively. Fur­
therm ore, the results show  that Petty and Cacioppo’s strong 
and w eak argum ents differ from  each other in  argum ent 
strength as well as in argum ent valence. In other words, both 
argum ent strength and valence cause the norm ative d iffer­
ence between the strong and weak arguments .The latter result 
seem s to contradict A reni and Lutz’s claim  that Petty and 
Cacioppo only m anipulated argum ent valence. This seem ing 
contradiction can be solved as follows: A reni and Lutz used 
participants who only registered w eaknesses in argum ent 
valence and not in argum ent strength. However, this does not 
m ean that there were no w eaknesses in argum ent strength; 
the participants just did not see them.
4  Ex p e r i m e n t  P e t t y  a n d  C a c i o p p o  c l a i m  t h a t
A R G U M EN T Q U A LITY  PLA YS AN IM PO RTA N T RO LE W HEN 
PEO PLE ARE H IG H L Y  IN V O LV ED
These people are m ore persuaded by strong than by weak argu­
ments. But the participants in Areni and Lutz’s experim ent only 
saw  w eaknesses in argum ent valence and not in argum ent 
strength. T his m ay suggest that it is argum ent valence that is 
responsible for the persuasiveness o f  strong argum ents instead 
o f  argum ent quality (that consists o f  argum ent valence and  argu­
m ent strength). But we do not know this for sure, because Petty 
and Cacioppo m anipulated argum ent strength as well as argu­
m ent valence, as our analysis has shown.
Question. A n  experiment was set up to answer the following ques­
tion: are highly involved people still more persuaded by strong 
than by weak argum ents when argum ent strength is m anip­
ulated and argum ent valence is kept constant?
Material. The research m aterial in  the present study was com pa­
rable with Petty and Cacioppo’s. It was also about introducing 
som e kind o f  Senior Com prehensive Exam. In Dutch, it was 
called the M E A, the ‘M ondeling Eindexam en voor A fs­
tudeerders’ (Oral Exam ination for Graduates).
The following two variables were manipulated in the experiment;
1 Issue Involvem ent: high or low
2 Argum ent Strength: strong or weak
The first variable ‘ Issue Involvem ent’ influences the motivation 
to carefully exam ine the given argum ents. A s  the personal con­
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sequences o f  an advocacy increase, it becom es m ore im portant 
for people to form  a veridical opinion because the consequences 
o f being incorrect are greater. Because o f  these greater personal 
consequences, people should be more motivated to engage in the 
cognitive work necessary to evaluate the true m erits o f the pro­
posal’ (Petty &  Cacioppo 19 8 6 : 82).
To m anipulate issue involvem ent, two versions o f  a text w ere 
created. In the first version the M EA was to be introduced at the 
participants’ own university (the U niversity o f  Nijmegen) in the 
following year. It was expected that the participants reading this 
version would feel h igh ly involved and m otivated. This would 
lead to a careful exam ination o f the text. In the second version, 
the M EA was to be introduced at the U niversity o f  Leiden in 
about ten years. It was expected that participants reading this ver­
sion would feel less involved and motivated. This would lead to a 
m ore superficial exam ination o f the text.
The second variable to be m anipulated was A rgu m en t 
Strength’. Three advantages o f  the introduction o f the M EA were 
given in each version o f  the text. The strong argum ents corre­
spond to Petty and Cacioppo’s strong argum ents, except for the 
removal o f  som e weaknesses discovered in the analytical part o f 
this study. Subsequently, weak argum ents w ere com posed by 
weakening one supporting argumentation per advantage on argu­
m ent strength. Schellens and Verhoeven’s evaluation questions 
were used for this.
The first advantage was an increase o f the grade point average 
by 34% . Argum ent strength was m anipulated by adding the fo l­
lowing sentence in the weak version: ‘All lectures are replaced by 
tutorials at this university in the same period.’ This extra sentence 
could lead to the conclusion that it was this introduction o f  tuto­
rials instead o f  the M EA  that caused the increase o f  the grade 
point average. The second advantage was that the M EA led to an 
im provem ent o f  teachers’ qualities. In the strong version, this 
was supported by the M inistry o f Education. In the weak version, 
this was supported by a teacher o f Ghent University. This is weak 
because a teacher is an unreliable source for stating that the M EA 
has led to an improvem ent o f his or her own qualities. Finally, the 
third advantage was that graduates o f  universities with M EA 
received higher starting salaries. In the strong version, this was 
supported by examples from  the universities o f Brussels and Leu­
ven. In the weak version, this was supported by a single example 
from  the hotel and catering school in Brussels, which is not even 
a university.
Four conditions were derived from  a crossing o f  the two vari­
ables:
3 H igh issue involvem ent / strong argum ents
4 H igh issue involvem ent / weak argum ents
5 Low issue involvem ent / strong argum ents
6 Low issue involvem ent / weak argum ents
T he m aterial consisted o f  four versions; each o f which covered 
one o f  the four conditions.
Note that there is a norm ative difference between the strong 
and the weak argum ents in the present study. According to 
O’Keefe ( 19 9 5 :14 ) , an independently-motivated account o f  argu­
m ent quality supplies us with general criteria to construct nor- 
m atively good argum ents. With the help o f  these criteria, the per­
suasiveness o f normatively strong versus weak arguments can be 
empirically examined. The arguments were therefore constructed 
by m eans o f Schellens and Verhoeven’s m ethod instead o f  Petty 
and Cacioppo’s empirical definition. Because o f  this approach, the 
strong argum ents are norm atively strong in argum ent strength 
and the weak argum ents are norm atively w eak in argum ent 
strength, whereas argum ent valence is kept constant.
Pilots. The m aterial was extensively tested in a series o f pilots. It 
was tested whether weaknesses in argum entation were seen 
and w hether the strong argum ents were really judged as
strong. The research m aterial was adjusted i f  needed. 
Participants. A  total am ount o f  6 0  participants joined the exper­
im ent, 4 1 fem ale, 19  m ale. A ll o f  them  were students at the 
U niversity o f  N ijm egen at one o f  the following studies: Law, 
History, Dutch, Psychology, Pedagogics or Physics. All partic­
ipants were between 17  and 24  o f  age and got approxim ately 
EU R 2,27  for their participation in the experiment.
Design. The participants were random ly assigned to one o f  the 
four conditions. Each version was read by 15 participants. 
Both variables had a between-participants design.
Procedure. The participants first read the m essage. Subsequently, 
they w ere asked to list their thoughts on the subject o f  the 
m essage for about three minutes. Afterwards, the participants 
had to categorize their thoughts into positive, negative or neu­
tral. The neutral reactions w ere later left aside. The partici­
pants’ categorization was the only categorization made. This 
is because Cacioppo, H arkins and Petty (19 8 1: 44-45) found 
that participants and independent judges largely put 
responses in the sam e categories.
The participants' thoughts can be seen as ‘cognitive reactions’ . The 
notion o f cognitive reactions stem s from  the Cognitive Response 
Model (Greenwald 196 8 ). Cognitive reactions reflect the w ay in 
which som eone processes inform ation. Cognitive reactions to a 
persuasive m essage from  a political party could be for example: 
‘How nice that they support the elderly’, ‘I find it unlikely that they 
will succeed in solving the traffic jam s’, et cetera.
Finally, the participants had to fill in scales to m easure their 
level o f  attitude and involvem ent. As for attitude m easurem ent, 
the participants were asked to judge the introduction o f the M EA 
by taking position on five-point scales in between four couples o f 
opposing adjectives: wanted - unwanted, bad - good, nice - 
unpleasant and insensib le - sensible. The attitude was deter­
m ined on the basis o f the scores on these scales. A s for involve­
m ent m easurem ent, the participants had to indicate to what 
am ount they felt involved with the introduction o f the M EA. They 
had to answ er the following questions on a five-point scale from  
‘Not at all’ to ‘To a very great extent’ :
• To what extent does the introduction o f the M EA  occupy you per­
sonally?
• Do you f in d  the introduction o f the M EA  o f great interest to your 
own life?
M anipulation checks. The attitude scales appeared to have su ffi­
cient coherence to be treated together (a =  .70). The involve­
m ent scales showed enough coherence as well (a =  .76). 
Subsequently, a t-test for independent m easurem ents was used 
to test whether the m anipulation o f issue involvement led to a dif­
ference in involvem ent. This was indeed the case: the high issue 
involvem ent versions led to a h igher score on the involvem ent 
scales than the low issue involvem ent versions (t (58) = 1.82 , p < 
.05). Because o f  this outcome, it is justified to use the term inol­
ogy o f  high and low involvem ent.
Table 2 Average cognitive reactions per subject, subdivided into positive, 
negative and neutral and average attitude per subject, both subdivided into high 
and low involvement and strong and weak arguments.
High Involvement Low Involvement
Strong Weak Strong Weak
Arguments Arguments Arguments Arguments
Cognitive Positive 1,47 1,00 2,07 1,93
Reactions Negative 2,13 1,80 1,87 2,07
Neutral 1,73 1,87 1,20 1,00
Attitude 4,57 4,62 4,63 4,50
Note to sixth row. 1 = very negative attitude; 5 = very positive attitude
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Results. Petty and Cacioppo claim that strong argum ents are more 
persuasive than weak argum ents w h en people are h igh ly 
involved, while argum ent quality does not have an effect when 
people are less involved. W hen people are h ighly involved, 
strong argum ents should lead to m ore positive cognitive reac­
tions and subsequently to a m ore positive attitude than weak 
argum ents. W eak argum ents should lead to m ore negative 
reactions and subsequently to a m ore negative attitude than 
strong argum ents. Our question was whether this is still the 
case when argum ent strength is m anipulated and argum ent 
valence is kept constant.
Univariate two-way analyses o f  variance were used to test 
whether there was an effect on the participants’ attitude and 
cognitive reactions. As for the participants’ attitude, no inter­
action effect was obtained (F  (1, 56) < 1) nor a m ain effect o f 
‘A rgum ent Strength’ or ‘ Issue Involvem ent’ (both F (x, 56) < 
1). Furtherm ore, no interaction effects were obtained on 
respectively the participants’ positive and negative cognitive 
reactions (F  (1, 56) < 1; F  (1, 56) = 1.0 7 , p  =  .57). A rgu m en t 
Strength’ did not have an effect on the am ount o f positive nor 
negative reactions (both F (1,56) < 1). In addition, there was no 
effect o f ‘Issue Involvem ent’ on the am ount o f  negative cog­
nitive reactions (F  (1, 56) < 1). The only effect found was a 
m ain effect o f ‘ Issue Involvem ent’ on the am ount o f  positive 
cognitive reactions (F (1, 56) = 5.77, p < .05). The less involved 
participants generated m ore positive cognitive reactions than 
the highly involved participants.
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were used to test whether 
there was a relationship between cognitive reactions (positive 
or negative) and the attitude. For each subject, the am ount o f 
negative cognitive reactions was subtracted from  the am ount 
o f positive reactions. The results confirm ed the presence o f  
this relationship (r = 0.59, p < .01). Hence, positive reactions 
led to a positive attitude and negative reactions led to a nega­
tive attitude.
Conclusions. According to the Elaboration Likelihood M odel, 
highly involved people should be m ore persuaded by strong 
than by w eak argum ents. The results o f  the present study 
show us otherwise. The strong argum ents did not lead to a 
more positive attitude than the weak argum ents and the weak 
argum ents did not lead to a m ore negative attitude than the 
weak argum ents. Furtherm ore, the strong argum ents did not 
lead to m ore positive cognitive reactions than the weak argu­
m ents and the weak argum ents did not lead to m ore negative 
reactions than the strong argum ents. Because o f  these nega­
tive results, it has become irrelevant that positive reactions did 
lead to a positive attitude and that negative reactions did lead 
to a negative attitude, just as the fact that less involved people 
saw no difference between strong and weak argum ents.
A  rem ark has to be m ade about the m ain effect o f  issue involve­
m ent on the am ount o f  positive cognitive reactions; highly 
involved participants generated less positive cognitive reactions 
than less involved participants. There m ay have been an effect o f 
involvem ent with the introduction o f  the M EA  on the desirabil­
ity o f the introduction o f this exam. The M EA was presented as a 
heavy exam  with a lot o f  extra pressure. Therefore, the h ighly 
involved participants (who had to do the exam) m ay have found 
the M EA  less desirable than the less involved people who w ere 
not to encounter the exam . M easurem ents on separate attitude 
scales support this suggestion; som e highly involved participants 
did find  the M EA  sensible and good, but also unw anted and 
unpleasant.
5 G e n e r a l  C o n c l u s i o n
Petty and Cacioppo claim  in their Elaboration Likelihood Model 
that argum ent quality determ ines the persuasiveness o f  a p er­
suasive m essage w hen people are w alking the central route to 
persuasion. This claim  was largely built upon their research 
m aterial about the Senior Com prehensive Exam. The research 
m aterial was based on an em pirical definition: argum ents are 
strong w hen people generate m ain ly positive reactions to them 
and argum ents are weak when people generate m ainly negative 
reactions to them.
The analytical part o f  our research was executed to find  out 
whether the argum ents in Petty and Cacioppo’s research material 
differ from  each other norm atively to empirically. It appears that 
this is the case; Petty and Cacioppo’s strong argum ents are nor­
matively stronger than their weak arguments, based on Schellens 
and Verhoeven’s method. Furtherm ore, we found out that Petty 
and Cacioppo’s argum ents differ norm atively from  each other in 
argum ent strength as well as in argum ent valence. In  other 
words, Petty and Cacioppo’s strong arguments are m ore probable 
and m ore desirable than their weak argum ents.
We have seen in the experim ental part o f the study that m anip­
ulation o f  argum ent strength did not lead to a difference in per­
suasiveness betw een strong and w eak argum ents when people 
were highly involved. This contradicts Petty and Cacioppo’s claim 
that the broad argum ent quality determines persuasiveness at the 
central route. It seem s to be the case that only the m ore narrow 
argum ent valence is responsible for this effect. But it m ay also be 
the case that the participants in the present study were not m oti­
vated or able enough to register the w eaknesses in argum ent 
strength. After all, Areni and Lutz tell us that judging argum ent 
strength instead o f  argum ent valence requires a higher level o f 
elaboration.
The question presents itse lf as to whether highly involved peo­
ple see the w eaknesses in argum ent strength. They m ay not see 
them  or they m ay see them  but are not influenced by them . In 
the present study, only 2 out o f  302  cognitive reactions discuss 
the weaknesses. The first option therefore seem s to be the case: 
people do not see the weaknesses in argum ent strength, not even 
when the subject is personally relevant to them. As opposed to 
this, Areni and Lutz found that weaknesses in argum ent valence 
are seen. It m ust be the case then that the w eaknesses in  argu­
m ent valence are not only seen but also cause the difference 
between the persuasiveness o f  the strong and weak argum ents.
6  S u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h
Judging by the results o f  Areni and Lutz’s and the present study, 
one would tend to say that it is argum ent valence that is respon­
sible for the persuasiveness o f  strong arguments when people are 
highly involved. But Petty and Cacioppo have m anipulated argu­
m ent valence unconsciously and their strong and weak argu­
m ents differ from  each other in argum ent strength as well as in 
argum ent valence. It therefore deserves recom m endation to con­
duct an experim ent, com parable with the present one, in which 
argum ent valence is m anipulated and argum ent strength is kept 
constant. This kind o f  research is necessary to find out whether 
it is really argum ent valence that is responsible for the difference 
in persuasiveness.
The ideas o f the ELM seem  sim ple: people are m ore convinced 
by strong than by weak argum ents on the central route, whereas 
argum ent quality is o f  no im portance on the peripheral route. 
The present study reveals that the persuasion process is far more 
complicated. Petty and Cacioppo (1986: 8) speak rightly o f a con­
tinuum : ‘We view the extent o f elaboration received by a m essage 
as a continuum  going from  no thought about the issue-relevant 
inform ation presented, to com plete elaboration o f  every argu­
m ent’ . They nevertheless choose to describe the m odel in terms 
o f  the central and peripheral route: ‘it’ s also im portant to note 
that these different theoretical processes can be viewed in their 
extrem e cases as specifying just two qualitatively distinct routes 
to persuasion’ (Petty &  Cacioppo 19 8 6 :1 1 ) .
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It m ust be sorted out which weaknesses in argum ent quality are 
detected at w hich elaboration levels. The results o f  the present 
and Areni and Lutz’s study suggest that motivated and able peo­
ple are capable o f  detecting w eaknesses in argum ent valence, 
whereas these people do not see w eaknesses in argum ent 
strength. According to Areni and Lutz, this is because judging the 
argum ent strength is a m ore dem anding task than judging the 
argum ent valence. But how m otivated and able does som eone
need to be to detect flaws in argum ent strength? Not to m ention 
the differences within the argum ent strength level: som e weak­
nesses are m ore transparent than others. The present study 
showed that the w eaknesses in argum ent strength were still not 
seen, in  spite o f their high transparency. Very subtle and obscure 
w eaknesses in argum ent strength m ay possibly just be detected 
by very motivated argum entation experts.
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N o t e s
1 The present study was performed 
within the framework of Van 
Dijk’s MA thesis.
2 You can contact one of the authors 
for more information on the 
analysis.
